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Modernization of Agriculture and Long-Term Growth 
 
This paper develops a two-sector model that illuminates the role played by agricultural 
modernization in the transition from stagnation to growth. When agriculture relies on 
traditional technology, industrial development reduces the relative price of industrial products, 
but has a limited effect on per capita income because most labor has to remain in farming. 
Growth is not sustainable until this relative price drops below a certain threshold, thus 
inducing farmers to adopt modern technology that employs industry-supplied inputs. Once 
agricultural modernization begins, per capita income emerges from stasis and accelerates 
toward modern growth. Our calibrated model is largely consistent with the set of historical 
data we have compiled on the English economy, accounting well for the growth experience of 
England encompassing the Industrial Revolution. 
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 “The man who farms as his forefathers did cannot produce much food no
matter how rich the land or how hard he works. The farmer who has access
to and knows how to use what science knows about soils, plants, animals, and
machines can produce abundance of food though the land be poor. Nor need he
work nearly so hard and long. He can produce so much that his brothers and
some of his neighbors will move to town to earn their living.” –T. W. Schultz
(1964)
1 Introduction
Sustained growth in living standards is a recent phenomenon. Estimates of per capita GDP
around the world indicate dramatic diﬀerences in growth in the past two centuries relative to
earlier historical periods. Prior to 1820, the world economy was in a Malthusian state with
little growth; per capita production in that year was only 50 percent higher than the level
estimated for ancient Rome, according to Maddison (2001). Similarly, Clark (2007) shows
that the material lifestyle of the average person around 1800 was roughly equivalent to that
of a person living in the Stone Age. During the past two centuries, however, the world’s
per capita output has increased eightfold. Because of its enormous welfare implications,
understanding the switch from stasis to progress has become of central concern to economists
interested in growth and development.
In a seminal paper, Hansen and Prescott (2002) proposed an explanation for the tran-
sition to modern growth that centers on the progress and enhanced choice of technologies.1
They argue that for a long period in history, the economy was trapped in the Malthusian
regime because people employed only land-intensive technology, which is subject to dimin-
ishing returns to labor. What triggered sustained growth was the adoption of a less land-
intensive production process that, although available throughout history, had not previously
been proﬁtable for individual ﬁrms to operate. However, the growth of usable knowledge
eventually made it proﬁtable to use this technology that is free of diminishing returns, thus
1O t h e re x p l a n a t i o n sf o rt h et r a n s i t i o nt om o d e r ng r o w t hh a v ep r i m a r i l yf o c u s e do nt h er o l ep l a y e db y
human capital accumulation and technological change at the aggregate level. Becker, Murphy and Tamura
(1990), Lucas (2002) and Doepke (2004) assign a central role to endogenous fertility choice and investment in
human capital. Another line of ideas emphasizes the relationship between population growth and endogenous
technological progress (e.g., Kremer, 1993; Goodfriend and McDermott, 1995; Jones, 2001). By combining
the two foregoing strands of research, Galor and Weil (2000) consider the nexus between human capital
investment and technological change as the key to transition. See also Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) for a
novel explanation that emphasizes the role of ﬁnancial market development and luck in growth transitions.
Galor (2005) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature on the transition from stagnation to growth.
1permitting an escape from Malthusian stagnation. Although Hansen and Prescott provide
powerful insight into the transition from stagnation to growth, their model is highly stylized.
In an aggregate framework with a single ﬁnal good, the model is abstracted from several key
features of long-term development such as structural transformation and the relationship
between agricultural and industrial growth.
This paper takes a more disaggregated approach by emphasizing one aspect of techno-
logical progress: the transformation of traditional agriculture. Admittedly, development
economists have long stressed the role played by agriculture in long-term growth.2 Schultz
(1964), in particular, argues that subsistence food requirements present a fundamental chal-
lenge to poor economies and that the modernization of agriculture is essential for sustained
g r o w t h . T h i sv i e wi se c h o e db ye c o n o m i ch i s t o rians. For instance, Wrigley (1990) states:
“The economic law of diminishing marginal returns was inescapable. The future was there-
fore bound to appear gloomy as long as it seemed proper to assume that the productivity of
the land conditioned prospects, not merely for the supply of food in particular, but also for
economic growth generally. Only if there were radical and continuous technological advances
in agricultural technology could this fate be avoided.”
Building on these insights from the economic history and development literature, this
paper develops and calibrates a two-sector model that highlights the importance of agricul-
tural modernization as a central mechanism of the transition from stagnation to growth.
Our model is motivated by three concurrent events that occurred in England between 1700
and 1909, a period encompassing the Industrial Revolution:
(a) the well-known fact that around 1820, per capita GDP for the English economy ended
al o n gﬂat trend and moved into to sustained growth (see Figure 1A);3
(b) the less well-known fact that the systematic adoption of farm machinery also began
around 1820–the percentage of farms that owned agricultural machines was nearly nil
at the beginning of the century, but the adoption of these machines became widespread
in the decades thereafter (e.g., Walton, 1979; Overton, 1996; see Figure 2)4;a n d
2Important contributions from among the vast collection of this literature include those of Johnston and
Mellor (1961), Jorgenson (1961), Schultz (1964) and Timmer (1988); Kelley, Williamson and Cheatham
(1972) present an early numeric simulation of a two-sector model; Johnson (1997) provides a recent survey.
3The statistical information quoted in this paper is obtained from multiple sources. See Section 5 and
Appendix B for detailed data descriptions.
4For centuries, advancements in agricultural productivity around the world were derived primarily from
2(c) perhaps the least known fact, but one that is central to our study, that the price of
industrial products relative to agricultural products in England declined persistently
for more than a century, hitting a low point in the 1820s and then stabilizing at that
level in the following decades (see Figure 1B).
Are these observed patterns merely historical coincidences?
We argue in this paper that the three events are causally linked through intricate re-
lationships between industrial and agricultural development. When agriculture relies on
traditional technology, industrial development reduces the price of industrial products rel-
ative to agricultural products, but has a limited eﬀect on per capita income, because most
labor has to remain. Growth is not sustainable until this relative price drops below a certain
threshold, thus making it proﬁtable for some farmers to adopt modern technology that uses
industry-supplied inputs. Industrial development is a necessary precondition for the mod-
ernization of agriculture. Once agricultural modernization begins, per capita income breaks
out of stasis and accelerates toward growth in conjunction with coordinated movements in
relative price, wage, land rent, and structural transformation. During the transition period,
when modern technology is adopted by some but not all farmers, the relative price stabilizes
to a threshold level at which farmers are indiﬀerent about which technology to employ.
More speciﬁcally, we model two sectors, agriculture and industry5. Central to our analysis
is the choice of two technologies that are potentially available to farmers. The ﬁrst choice
is traditional technology, which uses labor and land, the latter of which is in ﬁxed supply,
thus implying diminishing returns to labor. The alternative is modern technology, which
also employs an intermediate input that is produced by industry. In this paper, this input
represents farm machinery, but it could likewise refer to such factors as chemical fertilizers
and high-yield seed varieties. The cost of the input is determined endogenously, depending
in part on the industrial total factor productivity (TFP), which grows exogenously. Farmers
start with traditional technology. They then begin to use modern technology when the price
of the intermediate input falls below a threshold level such that its adoption yields higher
the experiences of farm people. However, starting around 1820, in England and in other parts of the world
such as the U.S., the application of scientiﬁc knowledge and the inputs supplied by industry have become
the engine of rapid agricultural productivity growth (Huﬀamn and Evenson, 1993; Johnson, 1997). This
paper deﬁnes agricultural modernization as the use of industry-supplied inputs in farming, which primarily
refers to the mechanization of the 19th century, but also includes chemical, biological and other agronomic
innovations of later periods.
5Hence, industry corresponds to the rest of the economy other than agricultural production. We also use
“nonagricultural sector” interchangeably with “industry.”
3proﬁts than the use of traditional technology alone. Agricultural modernization is crucial to
our model, as it ignites the transition process.
In a traditional economy, slow TFP growth in experience-based farming systems requires
a high employment share in agriculture to ensure suﬃcient food supply. Positive shocks to
agricultural productivity may lead to temporary structural transformation and per capita
income increases. However, high income induces population growth, which in turn reduces
the per worker output of agriculture because of the ﬁxed supply of land. TFP growth
in industry can generate neither sustained structural transformation nor income growth,
because most labor must remain in farming. Therefore, without modernizing agriculture, an
economy cannot break away from the Malthusian trap.
In the long-run, however, industrial TFP growth lowers the price of industrial products
relative to agricultural products, which eventually leads to agricultural modernization. The
transition to modern growth begins when this relative price drops below a critical level, thus
inducing farmers to adopt modern technology. During this transition, structural transfor-
mation accelerates, and the economy steps onto the path of sustained growth. The critical
link is that, as industrial TFP grows, the cost of intermediate inputs declines and a larger
quantity of intermediate inputs are employed in agricultural production, hence raising agri-
cultural labor productivity. In other words, with agricultural modernization, TFP growth
in industry will join forces with TFP growth in agriculture, contributing directly to agricul-
tural labor productivity growth through the use of intermediate inputs, and thus facilitating
structural change. In contrast to a traditional economy, in which per capita income is con-
s t r a i n e db ya g r i c u l t u r a lT F Pa n dp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t h ,T F Pg r o w t hi nb o t ha g r i c u l t u r ea n d
industry contributes to per capita income growth. In the transition period, the relative price
settles to a stable level such that farmers are indiﬀerent about which technology to use.
Continued industrial growth tends to lower relative price, but the eﬀect is oﬀset by the more
widespread use of modern technology. The transition ends with the complete adoption of the
new technology. Under modern growth, agriculture’s share of labor eventually approaches
zero in the limit, and the growth rate of per capita income converges to the growth rate of
industry.
To examine empirically the model’s predictions about the structural breaks and coordi-
nated movements in several macroeconomic variables through diﬀerent stages of long-term
growth, we turn to the Industrial Revolution in England. This focus reﬂects not only the
fact that England was the ﬁrst nation to emerge from Malthusian stagnation, but also the
availability of exceptionally rich historical data. We compile data on decennial time series
4of real per capita GDP, prices for agricultural and principal industrial products, agricultural
mechanization, employment share in agriculture, real average wages of adult farm workers,
and land rent from multiple sources. We also rely on historical studies of the English econ-
omy to infer the exogenous TFP growth in agricultural and nonagricultural production. We
then calibrate the model to the English economy, generate the time paths for the six key
aggregate economic variables through the periods of stagnation, transition and growth, and
present joint comparisons with their counterparts in the data. Our quantitative analysis
accounts well for the observed English experience of growth in the period between 1700 and
1909. The empirical ﬁndings, which also take into account the role of food trade, support a
coherent view of the importance of agricultural modernization in making the transition from
stagnation to growth possible.
Hence, the contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we contribute to the literature
on long-term growth with a quantitative model of growth transitions that emphasizes the
central roles played by agricultural modernization and structural transformation. Second,
drawing on historical statistics, we assess the empirical validity of the model and show that
it can account quantitatively for the growth experience of England encompassing the period
of the Industrial Revolution. The data we have compiled reveal some novel features of the
English economy that may be conducive to future research.
Recently, a burgeoning body of literature based on two-sector models has explored the
role of structural transformation in growth.6 Stressing the importance of agriculture in a
dual-economy model, our central idea lies in technological change within agriculture. This
emphasis is closely related to Hansen and Prescott’s study (2002), which investigates the
growth implications of switching from traditional to modern technology in an aggregate
model, and to that of Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2007), who examine the eﬀects of using
alternative agricultural technologies on the evolution of international income diﬀerences.7
However, their papers have major diﬀerences from ours. Hansen and Prescott’s framework
is essentially a one-sector model with two production technologies that produce a single
good. Therefore, their model leaves no room to explore the implications of the subsistence
food constraint, the interactions between industrial and agricultural development, and the
6See, for instance, Matsuyama (1992), Echevarria (1997), Laitner (2000), Caselli and Coleman (2001),
Kogel and Prskawetz (2001), Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001), Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002),
Ngai (2004), Wang and Xie (2004), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Hayashi and Prescott (2008), Acemoglu and
Guerrieri (2008) and Lucas (2009).
7A related paper is Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2008), which examines the role of the barriers to using
modern agricultural technology in accounting for cross-country income gaps.
5relative price changes as keys to agricultural modernization. Similar to us, however, Gollin,
Parente and Rogerson emphasize the importance of modern agricultural technology on long-
run growth, but they take agricultural modernization as an exogenous event.8 In contrast,
we provide an analytical model in which the modernization of agriculture is an endogenous
choice of farmers, and we investigate the timing and mechanisms of the transition process
by relating them to the changes in the relative price of industrial good. Unique to our
model is the emphasis on industrial development as a necessary precondition for agricultural
modernization. Moreover, we calibrate our model to the English economy and show that the
transition mechanisms we identify are quantitatively consistent with the England’s growth
experience. As we do in this paper, Stokey (2001) also calibrates a model of the British
Industrial Revolution for the period 1780-1850. However, her focus is on quantifying the
contributions made by growing foreign trade and TFP growth in individual sectors to overall
growth, rather than on investigating the transition from stagnation to growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structures of
the two-sector model. In Section 3, we analyze the equilibrium properties for a traditional
economy without the use of modern agricultural technology. Section 4 explores the features
of the transition to modern growth. In Section 5, we document the stylized patterns of the
English economy using data for the 1700-1909 period and present ﬁndings on how the predic-
tions of our calibrated model match the main features of the British Industrial Revolution.
Section 6 presents our concluding remarks.
2 The Two-Sector Model
A. Preferences and Endowments
Consider an economy in discrete time. There is a ﬁxed amount of land, Z, and Nt
identical individuals in period t. Each individual owns zt = N
−1
t Z amount of land and one
unit of time, which is supplied inelastically to work in the labor market.9 Let wt be the wage
rate and rt be the rental rate of land. Then, an individual’s income is yt = wt + rtzt.
8More speciﬁcally, they consider three alternative agricultural technologies: a traditional technology with
constant TFP, a modern technology with exogenous TFP growth, and another modern technology that
also uses manufactured capital input. Growth starts when there is a switch from the ﬁrst to the second
technology, which occurs exogenously by assumption. However, they allow for the choice between the second
and the third technology thereafter.
9We prohibit trading in land ownership. As householdsa r ei d e n t i c a li nt h i se c o n o m y ,t h i sa s s u m p t i o ni s
not substantial.
6There are two consumption goods, agricultural and nonagricultural (or industrial). Let
the agricultural good be the numeraire and pt be the price of the industrial good. Each
individual household consumes a constant amount c of the agricultural good (cat) and spends
its remaining income on the consumption of the industrial good (cnt).T h e r e f o r e ,w eh a v e
cat = c, (1)
cnt = p
−1
t (yt − c). (2)
Each individual lives for one period, and, at the end of period t,g i v e sb i r t ht ogt children.
The land owned by the parent will be divided equally among the children. We assume that
the population growth rate is a function of per capita income, gt = g(yt).T h u s ,
Nt+1 = g(yt)Nt. (3)
Because the agricultural good is used as the numeraire, per capita income yt is not the same
as the usual measure of national per capita income, which is deﬂated by a GDP deﬂator.
Rather, yt is a measure of the household’s capacity to purchase agricultural goods. This
corresponds well to the living standard measures used for the early stages of development
in the economic history literature, where they are often calculated as the ratio of nominal
income to the price of commonly consumed food products.
B. Production Technologies
The nonagricultural good is produced with a linear production technology:
Ynt = AntLnt,
where Ant represents TFP in the industrial sector.
Two technologies are potentially available for farm production. The traditional technol-






σ , 0 <σ<1.
Here, Zt and Lat are land and labor inputs, respectively, where Aat denotes the TFP in tra-
ditional agriculture10, σ is the labor share, and superscript T denotes traditional technology.
10According to the production speciﬁcation, the TFP in agiculture should be Aσ
at instead of Aat.F o r
exposition simplicity, however, we simply call Aat the agricultural TFP.
7The modern agricultural technology (with superscript M) uses an intermediate input, Xt,










t , 0 <α<1.
The intermediate input is produced outside of agriculture and has a factor share of α.T h e
production of one unit of the intermediate input requires π units of industrial output. Hence,
t h ep r i c eo ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t ei n p u ti sπpt. For simplicity, we assume that π =1for the rest
of the paper.
Because the production technologies have constant returns to scale, we assume, without
loss of generality, that there is one stand-in ﬁrm in each of the two sectors. Both ﬁrms
behave competitively, taking the output and factor prices as given and choosing the factor
inputs to maximize proﬁts.



















−ptXt − rtZt − wtLat
)
, (4)










The proﬁt maximization problem of the industrial ﬁrm is
max
Lnt
{ptAntLnt − wtLnt} (5)
C. Technology Adoption in Agriculture
If a farm adopts the modern technology and allocates ZM
t (> 0) amount of land and
LM
at(> 0) amount of labor to production using that technology, then, from (4), the optimal
































In comparison, if the farm uses the same amounts of land and labor for production using the




¢σ. Clearly, the farm will adopt







W h e nt h ee q u a l i t yi n( 6 )h o l d s ,t h ef a r mi si n d i ﬀerent about which of the two technologies to
choose; one or both may be used. This condition implies that the farm will adopt the modern
agricultural technology only when the relative price of the intermediate input (pt) falls below
a certain threshold. Because the intermediate input is produced in the nonagricultural sector,
the decline in its price is ultimately determined by the productivity growth in that sector.
Therefore, in our model, technological change in agriculture is a result of (or is induced by)
technological progress outside agriculture, as emphasized by Hayami and Ruttan (1971).
Our model adopts a general equilibrium approach in which the relative price pt inﬂuences
the farmer’s choice of technologies, and the equilibrium value of pt depends on the use of
technologies in agriculture. To pin down the exact conditions for technology adoption, we
need to solve the equilibrium price pt as a ﬁxed point. Before doing that, however, we ﬁrst
deﬁne the competitive equilibrium.
D. Market Equilibrium





t ,X t}t≥0, consumption allocations {cat,c nt}t≥0, and the size
of the population {Nt}, such that the following are true.
1. Given the sequence of prices, the ﬁrm allocations solve the proﬁt maximization problems
in (4) and (5).
2. The consumption allocations are given by (1) and (2).
93. All markets clear:
Yat = Ntc, (7)











4. The population growth rate is given by equation (3).
The following proposition holds for the competitive equilibrium.




σ and Φh =( 1− α)−1−σ
σ Φl.I n a g r i c u l t u r a l

























Proof: The proofs of the propositions are provided in Appendix A.
This proposition identiﬁes several factors that directly inﬂuence the use of modern agri-
cultural technology. First, TFP parameter Aat and land-to-population ratio Z/Nt are neg-
atively related to the adoption of modern technology. Second, the industrial TFP (Ant)
has a positive eﬀect on the adoption of the modern farm technology. As we shall shortly
elaborate on further, this is because a high level of industrial productivity lowers the price of
the nonagricultural good, thus reducing the cost of using the industry-supplied intermediate
input.11
11In the context of tractor adoption by farmers in the U.S., Manuelli and Seshadri (2003) recently argued
103 Traditional Economy
We deﬁne a traditional economy as one in which farmers use only traditional technology.
Proposition 1 suggests that if the initial land-to-population ratio Z/N0 is suﬃciently high
and/or the initial relative TFP An0/Aa0 is suﬃciently low, then the economy starts out as
a traditional one. The following proposition states the determination of the key variables in
this economy.













σ e Aat, (12)


















In period t, both per capita income (yt) and the employment share of agriculture (Lat/Nt)
are determined by variable e Aat, which can be interpreted as the measure of labor productivity
in traditional agriculture that increases with agricultural TFP Aat and land-to-population
ratio Z/Nt. This is an intuitive result: a higher level of agricultural TFP and land endowment
imply greater agricultural labor productivity, which, in turn, lead to higher per capita income
and a lower employment share in agriculture. Moreover, in period t, rental prices rise with
population size; the wage depends on agricultural labor productivity; and the relative price
(pt) is determined by the relative productivity of agriculture and industry ( e Aat/Ant).
The steady-state properties of the key variables can also be derived as follows. Equations
(14) and (15) suggest that a traditional economy can achieve sustained structural change
(i.e., persistent decline in the employment share of agriculture) and per capita income growth
that wage growth is a key factor in the diﬀusion of modern technology. In our model, as we show below, the
diﬀusion of modern agricultural technology is indeed associated with a rising wage rate. Both, however, are
the result of productivity growth in the nonagricultural sector.





























If Aat grows at a constant rate γa ≥ 1, then, the foregoing equation becomes








σ e Aat. (16)
We make the following assumption about function g(.).
Assumption 1 (i) g(c) < 1; (ii) there is a b y>c, such that g(b y) >γ
σ
1−σ
a ; and (iii) g(.) is
continuous and strictly increasing over the interval [0, b y), decreasing over the interval [b y,∞),
and limy−→∞ g(y)=1 .
Under this assumption, the population growth rate increases with income when starting
at an initially low income level. This growth rate then increases to its peak at a certain
income level, after which it declines with income and eventually converges to one. This
hump-shaped function for the population growth rate is consistent with typical patterns of
demographic transition.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique steady-state solution to the dif-
ference equation (16) such that the corresponding income per capita y∗ ∈ (c,b y).
Therefore, without the adoption of modern agricultural technology, the economy always
settles down at a Malthusian steady state with per capita income constant at y∗ and no
sustained growth in living standards. From equation (14), we know that the steady-state
value of e Aat, e A∗











Because y∗ > c, e A∗


















Consequently, in a traditional economy, the eﬀects of temporary agricultural TFP growth and
any initial advantage in land endowment on agricultural labor productivity are completely
oﬀset by the adjustment in population size in the long run. As a result, labor productivity
in agriculture is independent of both the agricultural TFP and land endowment. At the
Malthusian steady state, as equations (11) to (15) show, per capita income, wages, and the
employment share of agriculture remain at constant levels; land rental rises with population;
and relative price declines with industrial TFP growth.
4 Transition to Modern Growth
A. What Triggers the Transition?
We have shown that, without the use of modern agricultural technology, an economy
remains trapped in Malthusian stagnation. However, will the farmers in such an economy
eventually ﬁnd it proﬁtable to adopt the new technology?




Suppose the economy starts out with a steady-state equilibrium, where e Aat settles at a
constant level e A∗
a. Then, as long as Ant grows without bounds, a time will eventually come
at which the inequality (17) holds. The same point can be made based on the behavior of the
relative price of the nonagricultural good. From (11), pt = σc
σ−1
σ e Aat/Ant.I nt h eM a l t h u s i a n






which declines monotonically with the growth of industrial TFP. Hence, at some point in
time, the price of the nonagricultural good will reach a low threshold level pM = α(1−α)
1−α
α
such that the adoption condition (6) holds with equality. At that point, farmers will begin
to use the intermediate input for agricultural production. Thus, continued industrial TFP
growth, or a persistent decline in the relative price, eventually triggers the transition from
traditional agricultural technology to modern agricultural technology. Initially, when relative
productivity Ant/ e Aat only just surpasses threshold level Φl, but still remains below Φh,t h e
13industrial TFP is not suﬃciently large to meet the demand for intermediate inputs by all
farmers at a price that would make it proﬁtable for them to adopt the modern technology.
Under this scenario, the economy is at an equilibrium at which some but not all farmers will
use the new technology and the relative price pt stays at a level at which farmers remain
indiﬀerent about the choice of technologies. We deﬁne the transition period–the period
during which farmers use both technologies–as a mixed economy.
B. Mixed Economy
Proposition 4 In a mixed economy,
pt = p























































T h et i m ep a t h so ft h em a c r o e c o n o m i cv a r i a b l e si nt h i sm i x e de c o n o m yd i ﬀer signiﬁcantly
from those of the variables in a traditional economy. More speciﬁcally, note the following
structural breaks that occur in each of the variables.
The price of industrial products relative to agricultural products (pt): In the traditional
steady state, pt declines with the growth of Ant because e Aat is a constant (see equation 11).
Once agricultural modernization begins, pt settles to a constant level at which farmers are
indiﬀerent about the adoption of either technology. Industrial TFP growth tends to lower
the relative price, but this induces the more widespread use of modern technology, which
helps to keep the relative price at a stable level.
Per capita income (yt): At the Malthusian equilibrium, per capita income yt is trapped at
a low level because the slow growth of Aat is fully oﬀset by population adjustment (see equa-
tion 14). During the transition, however, when the two sectors are integrated through the
14use of industry-supplied modern inputs, Ant contributes directly to per capita income, thus
creating a clear structural break in the growth path of yt. The modernization of agriculture
helps an economy to escape the Malthusian trap.
The use of modern inputs in agriculture (ZM
t /Z): The ratio of the land devoted to new
technology over the total land area measures the extent of modern technology adoption. In
an agrarian economy, the old technology prevails. Once the transition begins, however, if the
TFP in nonagriculture Ant grows suﬃciently fast, then Ant/ e Aat increases over time, and the
proportion of land (and labor) allocated to modern agricultural production increases from
zero to one, as Ant/ e Aat moves from Φl to Φh (see equation 24).
Agriculture’s employment share (Lat/Nt): In a traditional economy, the employment
share is a decreasing function of e Aat, which depends positively on Aat and Z/Nt (see equa-
tion 15). Because e Aat tends to settle at a steady-state level, there can be no sustained
structural change in such as an economy. With mixed technologies, the share of employ-
ment in agriculture is also a decreasing function of Ant, because TFP growth in industry
reduces the cost of modern input Xt, thus inducing farmers to use more Xt and less labor.
Agricultural modernization thus makes sustained economic structural change possible.
Wage rate (wt): This is a constant at the Malthusian steady state. As the economy
e n t e r st h et r a n s i t i o n ,t h ew a g er a t eg r o w sw i t hi n d u s t r i a lT F PAnt.
Land rent (rt): During the transition, the land rental price is no longer a simple increasing
function of the population size, as in a traditional economy. The price of land is also aﬀected
by the relative TFP levels in the two sectors ( e Aat/Ant) because the intermediate input has
become a substitutable factor for land in agricultural production.
C. Modern Growth
When Ant grows suﬃciently fast, the relative productivity Ant/ e Aat will continue to rise
such that it eventually reaches threshold Φh. Thereafter, the economy enters into an era of
modern growth with the complete adoption of modern technology.









nt . Then, in a modern economy, we have






























yt =( 1 − α)
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which is a geometric average of the TFP levels in the two sectors. Therefore, TFP growth
















































Therefore, as long as (γa)
σ(1−α) (γn)
α > [g(b y)]
(1−σ)(1−α), e AM
at will grow without bounds, as
will per capita income.
Summarizing all of the foregoing results, we have the following.
Proposition 6 Under Assumption 1 and the assumption that (γa)
σ(1−α) (γn)
α > [g(b y)]
(1−σ)(1−α),
an economy that starts out in a Malthusian steady state will at some point move into a mixed
economy and, eventually, into a modern economy with sustained growth in per capita income.
16During this process, the relative price of nonagricultural goods declines in a traditional econ-
omy, remains constant in a mixed economy, and then declines further in a modern economy.
The employment share of agriculture starts to decline in the mixed economy period and con-
verges to zero in the modern economy. Land rent increases with population growth in both
the traditional and modern economy, and it also depends on the relative productivity growth
during the transition period. Finally, the real wage remains ﬂat in a Malthusian regime, but
begins to grow at the onset of the transition and indeﬁnitely into the future.
5 Quantitative Analysis of the English Economy, 1700-
1909
In this section, we examine whether our calibrated model can quantitatively account for the
growth experience of England from 1700 to 1909. We focus on long-term trends, structural
breaks, and coordinated movements across the six key macroeconomic variables–per capita
GDP, relative price, agricultural mechanization, farm employment share, real wage of agri-
cultural workers, and land rent. We ﬁrst describe our data sources and characterize the
major trends in the English economy, followed by model calibration and a discussion of our
ﬁndings.
A. Data Compilation
Our quantitative analysis employs data on the aggregate economic performance of the
English economy for the 1700 to 1909 period. The selection of this country is signiﬁcant,
not only because the Industrial Revolution ﬁrst occurred in England, but also because of
the availability of exceptionally rich historical data. We use England rather than the United
Kingdom as the unit of analysis because data for Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland
are incomplete for early historical periods. We choose 1700 as our starting year, as several
data series–including by-sector employment share and industrial output–are unavailable
for earlier historical periods. Our coverage ends in 1909, the year that concludes the ﬁrst
decade of the twentieth century, as World War I is considered to have opened another
historical era. The 1700-1909 period is long enough to span across the essential stages of the
transition from stagnation to growth in England, encompassing the Industrial Revolution.
We construct the data series on a decennial basis, emphasizing long-term trends with no
attempt to account for short-term ﬂuctuations. A decade consists of 10 years starting with a
rounded year of 10, i.e., 1700-1709; by this principle, 1909 marks the ending year of analysis.
17Although data for 1910 to 1912 are available, we do not use three-year data to represent
decennial trends. The data series consists of constructed indices of real per capita GDP,
population, employment share in agriculture, indices of agricultural mechanization, prices
of agricultural products, prices of principal industrial products, real average day wages of
adult farm workers, land rent, and food imports as a percentage of domestic production.
Moreover, we rely on historical studies of the English economy to obtain estimates for ex-
ogenous improvements in total factor productivity in both agricultural and nonagricultural
production.
Our data compilation is based on an extensive review of statistical sources, as well as
historical studies of the British economy. Completeness and reliability are two important
criteria. Hence, our data are drawn heavily from two authoritative volumes of British his-
torical statistics complied by B. R. Mitchell (1962, 1988), who assembled the best available
data from government sources, censuses, historical studies, economists, statisticians, and
independent scholarly publications. When certain data series are not available in Mitchell’s
volumes, or cannot be traced back to 1700, we have explored other historical studies. For
example, we have relied on the works of Clark (2001, 2002, 2004), Crafts and Harley (1992),
Deane and Cole (1967), and Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981), among those of other scholars.
Our sources and the construction of all of the key variables are described in greater detail in
Appendix B.
B. The English Economy, 1700-1909
Table 1 presents historical statistics on the English economy, encompassing the entire
course of the Industrial Revolution. In the period up to 1820, real per capita GDP ﬂuctuated
around a constant level, exhibiting typical features of a Malthusian regime. The employment
share in agriculture declined gradually, which is consistent with slow increases in agricultural
productivity. Starting in the early 1800s, however, the growth of per capita GDP and the
pace of structural transformation began to accelerate. Then, in the decades between 1820-9
and 1900-9, per capita GDP increased by a factor of 1.88, and the employment share of
agriculture dropped from 33 percent to 10 percent. By 1909, England was far ahead of
other countries in the extent of its structural transformation, and had clearly left behind the
stagnation of the Malthusian regime.
The escape from Malthusian stagnation occurred concurrently with the adoption and dif-
fusion of farm mechanization in England in the early 1800s. Despite the sparsity of historical
data, John Walton creatively used farm sale advertisements to quantify the adoption of farm
machines for selective regions of England and Wales for the years from 1753 to 1880 (see
18Walton, 1979; Overton, 1996; also see the details provided in Appendix B). Figure 2 reports
the percentage of the dispersal sales of farm stocks containing eight speciﬁct y p e so ff a r m
machinery. The use of threshing, haymaking, and chaﬀ m a c h i n e sb e g a na r o u n d1 8 1 0 ,a n d
the adoption of turnip cutters steadily continued from around 1820. The diﬀusion of these
machines, except for threshing machines, continued in an uptrend until 1880. Columns (6)
and (7) of Table 1 present the computed probabilities of a farm’s adoption of at least one
and at least two agricultural machines, respectively, during individual decades. In the case
of two machines, the rate of their possession by a typical farm was only 2 percent in 1810-9,
but had zoomed to 85 percent by 1880-9.
A central implication of our model is that the price of industrial goods relative to agri-
cultural goods falls continuously in the Malthusian steady state as a result of industrial
TFP growth [see equation (18)]. Then, during the transition to modern growth, the relative
price should settle at a constant level, as equation (19) demonstrates. The observed English
experience shows exactly this pattern (see Figure 1B). More speciﬁcally, as column (2) of
Table 1 reveals, the relative price index declined rather persistently from 2.14 in 1700-9 to 1
in 1820-9, and then ﬂuctuated at around that level thereafter.
Table 1 also shows the systematic patterns for real land rents and the real wage of
agricultural workers. The real wage remained ﬂat for more than a century, but began to rise
persistently after 1820. Throughout the period, real land rents exhibited an upward pattern,
although the extent of the rise appears to have been more pronounced in the ﬁrst rather
than the second period.
C. Incorporating Food Trade
We have so far presented a closed economy model without any discussion of international
trade. It is well known, however, that England was a net food exporter in the ﬁrst half of
the 18th century, and then turned into a net importer towards the end of that century (see
Overton, 1996; Deane and Cole, 1967). Table 1 suggests that food exports began to decline
around 1740-9, followed by an initially gradual growth in food imports–net imports relative
to domestic production were merely 1 percent in 1780-9, but the ratio increased steadily to
17 percent in 1850-9. However, soon after the repeal of the English Corn Law, food imports
exploded, ﬁnally reaching 76 percent of domestic production by 1900-9. Such changes in food
trade would clearly aﬀect the pace of structural transformation and possibly the time paths
of the other macroeconomic variables for the English economy. Therefore, it is necessary to
incorporate food trade into the benchmark model before moving on to carry out quantitative
analysis.
19Following the approach adopted by Stokey (2001), who observes that England already
imported signiﬁcant amounts of food in the 1820s, and exported roughly equal amounts of
manufactured goods in terms of value-added, we take food imports as exogenous and assume
balanced trade, such that the value of exports in nonagricultural goods is determined by the
need to import food. Denote it a st h ep e r c e n t a g eo ff o o di m p o r t sr e l a t i v et od o m e s t i cf o o d
production for year t. The market clearing conditions for agricultural and nonagricultural
goods become
(1 + it)Yat = Ntc, (30)
Ynt = Ntcnt + Xt + Et, (31)
where Et is the amount of exports in nonagricultural goods. We assume balanced trade, i.e.,
p
w
t Et = itYat,
where pw
t is the relative price of nonagricultural goods in the world market. As in Stokey
(2001), we take pw
t as an exogenous variable and assume that it remains at a level such that
t r a d ei sw e l f a r e - e n h a n c i n gf o rd o m e s t i ch o u s e h o l d sa tt h em a r g i n .I nA p p e n d i xA ,w es h o w
that this requires pw
t to be greater than or equal to the relative price of nonagricultural goods
under autarky. The solutions to this model with trade are identical to that of the benchmark
model with one exception: the subsistence consumption requirement changes to c/(1 + it).
With food trade now speciﬁed in the framework, we can proceed to examine whether our
model can quantitatively account for the growth experience of the English economy.
D. Model Calibration
For this quantitative exercise, each period in the model consists of 10 years, with the ini-
tial period starting in 1700-9. We assume that the model economy is initially in a Malthusian
steady state; then, in the 1820-9 period, it begins agricultural modernization, or the transi-
tion to modern growth. The technology parameters, subsistence consumption, initial TFP
levels, and population growth proﬁles are calibrated. We then feed the TFP growth rates
estimated from the historical data into the model to generate time series predictions for
six key variables–per capita GDP, relative price, agricultural mechanization, farm employ-
ment share, real wage of agricultural workers, and land rents–and compare them to their
c o u n t e r p a r t si nt h ed a t a .T h ed e t a i l sa r ea sf o l l o w s .
Technology parameters. We set the labor share in traditional agriculture σ at 0.6, consis-
tent with Hansen and Prescott (2002) and Ngai (2004). Following Restuccia, Yang and Zhu
20(2008), we set the share of intermediate input in modern agriculture α at 0.4.T h ev a l u eo f
land endowment Z is normalized to one.
Initial values. We normalize the initial value of income y0 to 1 and set N0 as the popu-
lation level of England in 1700. From equations (14) and (15), the following equation holds
in a traditional economy.






In the case with food imports, this equation becomes









Clark (2002) states that the fraction of labor in agriculture in England in 1700-9 was 0.55.
Hence, we can use the foregoing equation to pin down the value of c such that the implied
initial income level y0 in the model is 1. Given N0 and the calibrated value of c, we can
then use equation (15) adjusted for fo o di m p o r t st op i nd o w nt h ev a l u eo fAa0 such that the
implied value of La0/N0 in the model is 0.55. Because agricultural mechanization emerged
in England in the early nineteenth century, or around 1820-9 to be more precise (Walton,
1979; Overton, 1996), we choose the initial value of An0, such that, in our model, the use of
modern agricultural technology begins in that decade.
Population growth proﬁle. We assume that population growth follows the same functional
form as that in Hansen and Prescott (2002), and we use England’s observed decennial popu-
lation growth rates and per capita income levels to estimate the parameters of the function.
Similar to their schedule, this estimated population growth function increases linearly at low
income levels and then starts declining at a slower rate through a linear scheme.
Total factor productivity growth. For agriculture, Clark (2002) provides estimates for the
decennial TFP in English agriculture for the 1500-1910 period based on estimated factor
prices and their input shares and output prices. He shows that agricultural TFP grew at
a slow rate prior to 1860 and then increased rapidly from 1860 to 1910. Accordingly, we
assume that Aat grows at a decennial constant rate of γa1 for the 1700-1860 period and then
grows at another constant rate of γa2 for the period after 1860. As agricultural TFP is Aσ
at in
our model, the TFP growth rates in the two periods are γσ
a1 and γσ
a2, respectively. For each
of the two periods, i =1 ,2,w er e g r e s slog(TFP) on a time trend to obtain slope coeﬃcient
ξi, which is the decennial exponential growth rate. Then, to obtain the decennial growth
rate for Aat,w ec a l c u l a t eγai a c c o r d i n gt ot h ef o r m u l aγai =e x p ( ξi/σ).
With regard to TFP growth in nonagriculture, the pioneering work of Deane and Cole
21(1967) presents estimates of the aggregate economic performance of the British economy for
the 1688-1959 period. However, as most economic historians agree, output growth during the
Industrial Revolution was much slower than Deane and Cole’s original estimates indicate.
To obtain an estimate of Ant for England, we thus rely on the revised estimates of British
industrial production made by Crafts and Harley (1992) as the primary data source, assuming
that nonagricultural TFP growth were the same across regions in Great Britain. Their results
are widely accepted among economic historians, and have been used in recent quantitative
studies of the aggregate performance of the British economy (e.g., Stokey, 2001).
We use estimates of the output growth per worker in British industrial production to
approximate exogenous improvements in TFP for the nonagricultural sector, i.e. 4An/An =
4Yn/Yn − 4Ln/Ln, an approach that is consistent with our model speciﬁcation of linear
production technology Ynt = AntLnt.M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, we ﬁrst use the indices of British
industrial production for the 1700-1909 period, as covered in Crafts and Harley (1992), to
compute the rate of industrial output growth (4Yn/Yn). Crafts and Harley estimated the
annual growth rate of British industrial labor (4Ln/Ln) as 0.8 percent for the 1760-1801
period and 1.4 percent for the 1801-1831 perio d ;t h e r e f o r e ,t h ed e c e n n i a lg r o w t hr a t eo fAnt
for the 1760-1831 period can be inferred. For 1831-1909, we compute the decennial growth of
the industrial labor force based on the British population census reported in Mitchell (1962).
For the earlier period, 1700-1760, Clark (2002) reports both the share of the adult male labor
force in agriculture (sa) and estimates of that labor force (La) by decade; therefore, we can
compute the decennial nonagricultural labor force, i.e., Ln = La(1−sa)/sa. By assuming that
the labor force in the nonagricultural sector grew at a similar rate as that in the industrial
sector, we can obtain nonagricultural TFP growth for the 1700-1760 period.
E. Simulation Results
The primary objective of our model is to illuminate the transition mechanisms of stagna-
tion to growth, highlighting the causal linkages among several macroeconomic variables over
the very long run. Although it is not our intention to provide a detailed model of the Eng-
lish growth experience, the success of our calibration certainly helps to validate the model’s
relevance. In this vein, we compare the model’s predictions for the six major variables with
data for the English economy over the 1700-1909 period.
Figure 3 presents the time paths of the variables–actual data series versus model simu-
lations with and without food trade. Figure 3C, which reports the computed probabilities
of adopting at least one (data 1) and at least two (data 2) agricultural machines on a farm
during the individual decades, reveals the transition paths from traditional to mixed and
22modern economies.12 In the traditional economy that existed before 1800-19, farms used
only the old technology, as the model implies. Agricultural mechanization began around
1800-19, and the transition to modern growth took about eight periods (or decades), ending
in 1890-9 with the complete adoption of the new technology.
Overall, the time paths of the variables predicted by the model track the structural breaks
and systematic trends that occurred in the English economy over more than two centuries
well. In the periods before 1820-9, the economy was settled in the Malthusian steady state,
where per capita GDP (Figure 3A) and the real wage (Figure 3E) both remained constant.
The growth in industrial TFP led to a persistent decline in the relative price (Figure 3B),
but before this price reached a low threshold level, farmers did not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to use
modern productive inputs, which resulted in no adoption of farm machinery (Figure 3C).
Therefore, agricultural productivity remained at a low level because of diminishing returns
to labor due to the ﬁxed supply of land. The closed economy model implies that there was no
structural transformation during this period because the low level of agricultural productivity
limited the release of labor to industry (Figure 3D). For England, however, the switch in
its trade position from exporting to importing food facilitated structural transformation.
Indeed, along with increases in net food imports, the employment share in agriculture began
a steady decline in the middle of the 18th century, although the economy remained trapped
in the Malthusian regime (Figure 3D).
Starting in 1820-9, when continuous industrial development pushed the relative price
down to a low enough critical level, proﬁt-maximizing farmers began to adopt the modern
input produced by the industrial sector. This agricultural modernization then triggered
a virtuous cycle. As farmers substituted modern agricultural inputs for labor, structural
transformation accelerated. As a result, per capita income emerged from stasis and began
its high rate of growth. This is because once agricultural modernization begins, the TFP
growth in industry joins forces with it, thus contributing to aggregate growth [see equation
(22)]. During the transition, the model’s predicted relative price settles to a constant, which
is consistent with the data. By and large, the predicted wage (Figure 3E) and land rent
(Figure 3F) also track the data well. Although the rent displays an upward pattern,13 the
12We use the estimated probability of adopting agricultural machinery as our measure of agricultural
modernization because historical data on the percentage of land and labor allocated to modern technology
are not readily available. This variable is closely matched with the measure of modern technology adoption
speciﬁed in the model, which is the fraction of productive inputs (land and labor) devoted to the new
technology.
13The model tracks the data well in the period before 1820, as a larger popuation has a direct and positive
23real wage remains ﬂat for more than a century, but then rises persistently.
Despite the success of model simulations in matching the general time paths of all six
macroeconomic variables, two noticeable discrepancies remain. The ﬁrst is the gap between
the predicted relative price and the price revealed by the data in the ﬁrst century,14 although
the downward trends are very similar. The second inconsistency relates to the adoption of
modern technology and the land rent: whereas the data indicate continuous increases in
these two variables, in the model simulations with food trade, the predicted land rent and
the fraction of agricultural input devoted to the new technology exhibit two to three periods
of setbacks in the middle of the 19th century. In those decades surrounding the repeal of
the English Corn Law, national food imports as a fraction of domestic production jumped
by double-digit percentage points (see Table 1). In our model with trade, large increases
in food imports would substitute for domestic food production, which in turn would reduce
the demand for agricultural inputs. This theoretical result is unlikely to be fully revealed in
t h ed a t ab e c a u s ef a r m e r sw o u l dc o n t i n u et oo w nm o d e r nm a c h i n e r ya n df a r mt h el a n da t
least in the short run, despite the reduced demand for domestic food production. We should
stress that, after this short pause, the adoption of modern technology and land rents return
to their upward trend, thus conforming with the patterns revealed in the data. Overall,
the simulation results support a coherent and uniﬁed view of the importance of agricultural
modernization in making the transition from stagnation to growth.
6 Concluding Remarks
History has witnessed persistent technological advances.15 Long before the Industrial Revolu-
tion, the Greeks and Romans discovered cement masonry, developed sophisticated hydraulic
systems, and made great strides in advancing civil engineering and architecture. The inven-
tions developed in China, including paper, printing, the magnetic compass and gun powder,
raised production eﬃciency through diverse channels. In the Middle Ages, dramatic improve-
eﬀect on land rent [see equation (13)]. During the transition, however, the determination of land rent becomes
more complex, as equation (21) suggests.
14This could be the result of under-estimating industrial TFP growth in the 1700-1820 period, which
depends on historical estimates of industrial output, the industrial labor force, and assumptions regarding
the growth rates of output and labor force across the industrial and more inclusive nonagricultural sectors.
We have not been able to identify the exact source of possible errors.
15See Mokyr (1990) for a summary of technological progress from the classical antiquities to the modern
era of the later nineteenth century.
24ments in energy utilization through the use of windmills, waterwheels, and horse technologies
eﬀectively expanded the frontiers of production, and the creation of the mechanical clock
marks the entry of a key machine of the modern industrial age. Turning to the Renaissance,
in addition to its remarkable scientiﬁc achievements, innovations in shipbuilding, mining
techniques, spinning wheels for textile production, and the use of blast furnaces raised the
capacity of industrial production to new levels. Why then did these major technological
advances fail to generate sustained improvement in living standards?
We have argued in this paper that productivity growth in industry during early develop-
ment is not enough to pull an economy out of a stagnant equilibrium. This is because the low
level of labor productivity associated with traditional agriculture requires much of the labor
force to produce food, thus imposing a constraint on per capita income growth. The decline
in the relative price of industrial output not only reﬂects technological progress in industry,
but also acts as an agent–when it falls below a critical level–inducing farmers to adopt
modern technology that relies on industry-supplied inputs. Agricultural modernization ig-
nites the transition to modern growth. Our analysis compliments the existing explanations
for this transition that focus on the role played by technological change and human capi-
tal accumulation. For instance, when structural transformation accelerates along with the
modernization of agriculture, the rate of return to human capital is likely to rise because the
dynamic environment of industry provides higher rewards for skill. Consequently, families
will invest more in human capital and have fewer children. The average fertility rate will
drop further because of a declining percentage of rural families. The emphasis on agricultural
technology also provides speciﬁc content for long-term technological progress, thus allowing
us to explore the timing and coordinated movements in macroeconomic variables through
the transition from stagnation to growth.
Farm mechanization in England was only the beginning of agricultural modernization.
In the past two centuries, the development of farm technology has been integrated into
the rapidly expanding and increasingly complex systems of industrial and scientiﬁca d v a n c e -
ments. The application of chemical and biological science has led to numerous inventions and
has reduced the costs of fertilizers and new seeds, which have vastly improved agricultural
productivity. In the United States, for instance, the labor employed on farms to produce
a ton of wheat or corn in the 1980s was about 1-2 percent of the labor needed in 1800,
and for a bale of cotton, only 1 percent (Johnson, 1997). In the twentieth century, labor
productivity growth in agriculture has generally outpaced that in other sectors of industrial-
ized economies. The modernization of agriculture has been a crucial force driving sustained
25growth. In contrast, agricultural labor productivity in less developed countries, where there
is little use of modern inputs, is very low. As Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2008) show, agri-
cultural GDP per worker in the richest 5 percent of countries in 1985 was 78 times that of
the poorest 5 percent, whereas their GDP per worker in nonagricultural sectors diﬀered only
by a factor of 5. Therefore, as our theory suggests, the provision and implementation of
locally productive modern technologies in agriculture may contribute a great deal in helping
the poorest countries escape from economic stagnation. The modernization of agriculture
should be a central component of any development policy.
Appendix A: Proofs of the Propositions
The proofs of Propositions 2, 4, and 5 are given in a not-for-publication appendix available
from the authors upon request. The proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 and the case with trade
incorporated into the model are provided below.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Let e Aat = Aat(Z/Nt)
1−σ
σ . In a not-for-publication appendix, we derive the equilibrium
prices in the three possible cases as follows.
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(3) Both technologies are used:
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The later inequality is equivalent to
p
T
t >α (1 − α)
α(1−σ)+σ(1−α)
ασ = α(1 − α)
1−α
α (1 − α)
1−σ
σ .
Apparently, as long as pT
t ≥ α(1−α)
1−α
α , the foregoing inequality is automatically satisﬁed.
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Both will be satisﬁed if the latter is satisﬁed. Hence, the necessary and suﬃcient condition
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neither traditional technology alone nor modern technology alone can be an equilibrium.
The only possible equilibrium is when both technologies are used.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
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With trade, all of the equilibrium conditions remain the same as before, except for the
following two market clearing conditions for agricultural and nonagricultural goods:
(1 + it)Yat = Ntc, (32)
Ynt = Ntcnt + Xt + Et. (33)
Here, Et is the amount of exports in nonagricultural goods. As market clearing condition
(32) can be rewritten as
Yat = Ntct,
28where ct = c/(1+it), Propositions 1 to 5 remain the same if we replace c with ct.N o t et h a t
the condition for balanced trade requires that
p
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Because the per capita consumption of the agricultural good is always c, the representative
household’s welfare is determined by the consumption of nonagricultural good cn.F o r t h e



















































That is, the condition for trade to be welfare improving requires the relative price of the
29nonagricultural good in the world market to be higher than or equal to the domestic relative
price. Similar conditions can be proved for the cases of the mixed economy and modern
growth.
Appendix B: Description of the Data
Population and sectoral labor share. The ﬁrst population census of Great Britain was
conducted in 1801 and once every 10 years thereafter. We use the arithmetic average of the
1801 and 1811 ﬁgures in England as its population for the decade 1800-09, and then apply
the same estimate for later decades. For the period from 1700 to 1799, we deploy the yearly
population estimates used by Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981), which are reconstructed from
local parish registers. To be consistent with the timing of the census, a simple arithmetic
average of yearly population ﬁgures–starting from the ﬁrst year of one decade to the ﬁrst
year of the next decade — is used as the decennial population ﬁgure. Then, we connect
population ﬁgures from the two sources to cover the entire period 1700-1909.
The share of employment in agriculture is approximated by the share of males employed in
agriculture (Clark, 2001), where the number of farm workers is estimated from the population
censuses of 1801 an onwards. For the years before 1800, Clark builds on an estimate made
by Lindert and Williamson (1982) that the farm labor force was no more than 53 percent
of the adult male population in the 1750s. Clark applies a linear interpolation method to
recover the share of male labor in agriculture for the 1750-1800 period and applies an income
elasticity approach to recover that share in agriculture back to 1700.
Per capita GDP. For the period from 1700 to 1869, Clark (2001) provides decennial real
per capita GDP for England and Wales. We use this data series for England with the implicit
assumption that per capita GDP is the same across the two regions, an assumption that is
often made by economic historians in similar constructions of income data. To construct
real per capita GDP for the 1870-1909 period, we use the growth rates of real GDP per
worker reported in the most recent study published by Feinstein (1990). We use his updated
ﬁgures because his earlier estimates of per capita GDP were previously regarded as the
best available information (Mitchell, 1988). Based on Feinstein (1990), the growth rates of
real GDP per worker in the United Kingdom was 1.32 percent for 1856-73, 0.9 percent for
1873-82, 1.43 percent for 1882-99, and 0.31 percent for 1899-1913. Using these ﬁgures, we
compute the weight-adjusted decennial growth rates of real GDP per worker for the four
decades from 1870 to 1909, and we are thus able to form an index of decennial real GDP
per worker. Combining this with information on the share of the labor force in the total
30population from the decennial population census (Mitchell, 1962), we are able to construct
an index of decennial real per capita GDP for the United Kingdom. Connecting this index
with the index for earlier decades reported in Clark gives us an index of real per capita GDP
for England for 1700-1909.
Agricultural mechanization and food imports. The systematic adoption and diﬀusion of
farm machinery in England began in the early 1800s. Despite the sparsity of historical data,
John Walton creatively relied on farm sale advertisements to quantitatively document the
adoption of farm machines for selective regions of England and Wales for the period between
1753 and 1880 (Walton, 1979). The original data consist of 3,115 advertisements for dispersal
sales of farm stocks that appeared in the Reading Mercury and Jackson’s Oxford Journal in
Oxfordshire in England. Walton’s study presents time series information on the percentage
of farm households adopting each of eight farm machines, including turnip cutters, cake
crushers, and reaping, mowing, haymaking, chaﬀ, threshing and winnowing machines.
We construct two decennial indices of agricultural mechanization for England for the
1700-1909 period. Using information on the farm ownership of speciﬁc machines, we compute
the ﬁrst index as the probability of a typical farm household adopting at least one machine
and the second index as the probability of it adopting at least two machines during individual
decades. We use these two indices to approximate the extent of agricultural mechanization.
Quantitative analysis of the model, which assumes subsistence food consumption in a
closed economy, requires making adjustments to England’s food trade with other economies.
In particular, the model simulation uses information on food imports or exports as a per-
centage of domestic agricultural production. Although Mitchell (1962) reports the value of
net food imports into the United Kingdom from 1854 onwards, estimates of earlier years had
to be drawn from other sources. Overton (1996) and Deane and Cole (1967) both present
decennial data on food imports relative to domestic production, but there are trade-oﬀsi n
choosing between the two sources–the former covers the longer data series of 1700 to1859,
but has missing values for several decades, whereas the latter has a shorter series, from 1700
to 1820, but without missing values. On the whole, the two data series report very consistent
trends. We construct a net import/output series for 1700-1851 based on the Overton series
by applying a linear interpolation scheme to ﬁll in the missing data. For 1850-1909, we divide
the value of decennial imports (grain and ﬂour plus meat and animals) taken from Mitchell
(1962, pp. 298-300) by the value of agricultural production he reports (p. 366). We connect
the two time series by normalizing the overlapping decade of 1850 to a common value.
Relative price. Clark (2004) uses a consistent method to construct an annual price series
31for English agricultural output in the years 1209-1912. This series consists of information
from 26 commodities: wheat, barley, oats, rye, peas, beans, potatoes, hops, straw, mustard
seed, saﬀr o n ,h a y ,b e e f ,m u t t o n ,p o r k ,b a c o n ,t a l l o w ,e g g s ,m i l k ,c h e e s e ,b u t t e r ,w o o l ,ﬁre-
wood, timber, cider, and honey. We take the arithmetic average of farm price indices within
decades to form our decennial agricultural price series for the period from 1700 to 1909.
T h e r ei sn os i n g l ed a t as o u r c et h a tp r o v i d e sa g g r e g a t ep r i c es e r i e so nn o n a g r i c u l t u r a lp r o -
duction for the English economy during the historical period we cover. However, Mitchell’s
work (1962) contains suﬃcient information to enable the construction of a long price series for
principal industrial products. For the period between 1700 and 1800, we use the Schumpeter-
Gilboy price indices for producer goods, which consist of 12 industrial products–bricks, coal,
lead, pantiles, hemp, leather backs, train oil, tallow, lime, glue, and copper. This series ends
in 1801.
To continue the price series for 1800-1913, we adopt the Rousseaux price index for prin-
cipal industrial products, which signiﬁcantly overlaps in terms of product coverage with the
Schumpeter-Gilboy price index (Mitchell, 1962). From 1800 to 1850, the Rousseaux price
index covers coal, pig iron, mercury, tin, lead, copper, hemp, cotton, wool, ﬂax, tar, tobacco,
hides, skins, tallow, hair, silk, and building wood. For the years between 1850 and 1909, the
index covers coal, pig iron, tin, lead, copper, hemp, cotton, wool, linseed oil, palm oil, ﬂax,
tar, jute, tobacco, hides, skins, foreign tallow, native tallow, silk, and building wood. We con-
nect the two price indices and use them as a constructed price series for the nonagricultural
sector.
Wage and land rent. In his study of agricultural performance and the Industrial Revolu-
tion, Clark (2002) assembles data on the key variables for English agriculture for 1500-1912
from various published sources. Based on Clark’s analysis, we use the average day wages of
adult male farm workers outside harvest time as a proxy for the wages of basic labor–the
trend of this series closely resembles the changes in real wages for all workers from 1770 to
1870, the period studied by Feinstein (1998). The land rents are the market rental values of
farmland, including payments for tithes and taxes.
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37Real Relative Employment Real  wage  Real  Farm Farm Food imports as 
per capita price share in  agricultural land machines machines fraction of domestic 
Year GDP (Pn/Pa) agriculture labor rent n≥1n ≥2 production (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1700-9 0.80 2.14 0.55 1.01 0.62 0.00 0.00 -0.02
1710-9 0.79 1.89 0.54 0.95 0.64 0.00 0.00 -0.03
1720-9 0.83 1.83 0.53 0.97 0.69 0.00 0.00 -0.04
1730-9 0.93 1.91 0.52 1.13 0.73 0.00 0.00 -0.05
1740-9 0.85 1.95 0.52 1.10 0.67 0.00 0.00 -0.07
1750-9 0.86 1.77 0.53 1.01 0.77 0.00 0.00 -0.06
1760-9 0.84 1.83 0.49 0.98 0.75 0.00 0.00 -0.03
1770-9 0.85 1.59 0.47 0.92 0.75 0.00 0.00 -0.01
1780-9 0.82 1.71 0.44 0.97 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.01
1790-9 0.82 1.54 0.40 0.89 0.75 0.04 0.00 0.04
1800-9 0.84 1.29 0.37 0.81 0.75 0.07 0.00 0.06
1810-9 0.91 1.13 0.35 0.87 0.87 0.23 0.02 0.09
1820-9 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.42 0.07 0.11
1830-9 1.02 0.97 0.30 1.05 1.01 0.49 0.09 0.13
1840-9 1.06 0.96 0.26 1.11 1.08 0.75 0.29 0.15
1850-9 1.07 1.08 0.24 1.18 1.08 0.85 0.48 0.17
1860-9 1.08 1.03 0.21 1.18 1.11 0.91 0.62 0.24
1870-9 1.23 0.94 0.17 1.44 1.19 0.95 0.77 0.46
1880-9 1.40 0.90 0.15 1.69 1.24 0.98 0.85 0.56
1890-9 1.61 0.91 0.12 2.02 1.26 N.A. N.A. 0.66
1900-9 1.88 1.04 0.10 2.08 1.13 N.A. N.A. 0.76
Table 1: Historical Statistics of England: 1700-1909
   Note: the figures in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) are indices of the corresponding variables with their 1820-09 values normalized to one. 
Columns (6) and (7) report the computed probabilities of a farm adopting at least one and at least two agricultural machines, respectively,    
during individual decades. See Appendix B for details on how these time series were constructed.













































Figure 1. Real Per Capita GDP and the Relative Price 































































Figure 2. Percentage of Farms Adopted Agricultural Machinery for Oxfordshire Regions in England: 5-year Moving Means
         Source: Walton (1979).
40   Note: Data 1 and 2 in the left middle panel are the computed probabilities of a farm adopting at least 
one and at least two agricultural machines, respectively, in individual decades.
Figure 3. Trends in Major Macroeconomic Variables in England:





































































































































































































Data Model, w ithout trade Model, with trade
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